Showing 1 - 10 of 19,158
This paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the … is simple: by monitoring too much we learn less on how the partner will behave when he is not monitored. Only by giving …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261760
the shapes of contracts and the amount of monitoring. Equity-like contracts and excessive monitoring emerge when … principals are able to coordinate monitoring or verify each others? monitoring efforts. When this is not possible, free riding in … monitoring weakens the incentive to monitor, so that flat payments, debt-like contracts and very low levels of monitoring appear …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261310
This paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the … is simple: by monitoring too much we learn less on how the partner will behave when he is not monitored. Only by giving …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703754
This paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the … is simple: by monitoring too much we learn less on how the partner will behave when he is not monitored. Only by giving …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063690
This paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the … is simple: by monitoring too much we learn less on how the partner will behave when he is not monitored. Only by giving …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515714
In this paper, we argue that important labor market phenomena can be better understood if one takes (i) the inherent incompleteness and relational nature of most employment contracts and (ii) the existence of reference-dependent fairness concerns among a substantial share of the population into...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003793473
In this paper, we argue that important labor market phenomena can be better understood if one takes (i) the inherent incompleteness and relational nature of most employment contracts and (ii) the existence of reference-dependent fairness concerns among a substantial share of the population into...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012768171
This paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the … is simple: by monitoring too much we learn less on how the partner will behave when he is not monitored. Only by giving …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319537
This paper provides a rationale for equal sharing in heterogeneous partnerships. We introduce project choice and information sharing to a standard team production setting. A team with two agents can choose whether they want to work on a status quo project or on an alternative project. If the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012029071
The paper studies the nature, determinants, and impacts of "negative" activities in organizations. In competing for promotion, the members in organizations can work not only to enhance their own performances, but also to "sabotage" their opponents' performances. They find it worthwhile to engage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014105907