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On the choice of incentives in firms : influence activity, monitoring technology and organizational structure

Delmastro, Marco (contributor) - In: Economics bulletin : EB (2002)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001741008

Imperfect monitoring of monitoring agents : one reason why hierarchies can be superior to "lean" organizations

Kirstein, Roland (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001807862

Der Einfluss der Organisationsstruktur auf die Leistungskontrolle

Lindenthal, Sabine - In: Flexibilisierungstendenzen in der betrieblichen …, (pp. 85-108). 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001521493

Imperfect Monitoring of Monitoring Agents: One Reason Why Hierarchies Can Be Superior to "Lean" Organizations

Kirstein, Roland - 2003

Effective monitoring requires proper incentives and detection skill. Detection skills depend on the extent of specialization in monitoring and on the number of agents to be supervised. This paper demonstrates that hierarchy and monitoring of monitors can provide the necessary incentives for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296886