We show experimentally that a principal?s distrust in the voluntary performance of an agent has a negative impact on … the agent?s motivation to perform well. Before the agent chooses his performance, the principal in our experiment decides … opportunistically. We find that most principals in our experiment do not restrict the agent?s choice set but trust that the agent will …

We show experimentally that a principal's distrust in the voluntary performance of an agent has a negative impact on … the agent's motivation to perform well. Before the agent chooses his performance, the principal in our experiment decides … opportunistically. We find that most principals in our experiment do not restrict the agent's choice set but trust that the agent will …

We show experimentally that a principal’s distrust in the voluntary performance of an agent has a negative impact on … the agent’s motivation to perform well. Before the agent chooses his performance, the principal in our experiment decides … opportunistically. We find that most principals in our experiment do not restrict the agent’s choice set but trust that the agent will …

We show experimentally that a principal's distrust in the voluntary performance of an agent has a negative impact on … the agent's motivation to perform well. Before the agent chooses his performance, the principal in our experiment decides … opportunistically. We find that most principals in our experiment do not restrict the agent's choice set but trust that the agent will …

agents with different productivities. In contrast, considerations of trust, reciprocity and cooperation - the social … in work groups. The selection effect is larger than the motivation effect. …

nachgewiesenenVerdrängung intrinsischer Motivation durch den Einsatz von Überwachungs-und Sanktionsinstrumenten, gibt es Indizien dafür, dass … die von derAgency-Theorie implizierte Ausübung expliziter Kontrolle auch das Ausmaß anVertrauen zwischen … intrinsic motivation resultingfrom measures of explicit control, one can assume that extensive monitoringand performance …

it becomes scarce. In the second, restraint serves to conceal the actor's intrinsic motivation. In both cases, not …

classic simple bargaining games (ultimatum, dictator, and trust games). Specifically, we experimentally manipulate sleep … time‐of‐day of the decisions. We find a robust result of increased greed, reduced trust, and reduced trustworthiness …

trust contracts that pay a generous wage upfront are less efficient than incentive contracts. The principals understand this …