In diesem Papier wird das Handelsverhalten großer Marktteilnehmer während des Versuchs einer künstlich erzeugten Marktknappheit untersucht. Wir betrachten den in London gehandelten Bond-Future Kontrakt. Unter Verwendung der Cash- und Future-Transaktionen von Händlern und Kunden untersuchen...

Die London Stock Exchange hat im Jahr 1997 dem Publikum die Möglichkeit eingeräumt, durch die Abgabe von limitierten Ordern bei bestimmten Aktien direkt mit den Händlern zu konkurrieren. Anders als bei der NASDAQ, wurde in London für diese Aktien auch die Verpflichtung für die Händler...

Using a robust bootstrap procedure, we find that top hedge fund performance cannot be explained by luck, and hedge fund performance persists at annual horizons. Moreover, we show that Bayesian measures, which help overcome the short-sample problem inherent in hedge fund returns, lead to superior...

In 1997, the London Stock Exchange, like NASDAQ, allowed the public to compete directly with dealers in a subset of stocks through the submission of limit orders. However, unlike NASDAQ, for these stocks, London also removed the obligation of dealers to quote firm two-way prices, and became a...

This paper investigates how bond dealers manage core business risk with interest rate futures and the extent to which market quality is affected by their selective risk taking. We observe that dealers use futures to take directional bets and hedge changes in their spot exposure. We find that,...

The practices of preferencing and internalization have been alleged to support collusion, cause worse execution and lead to wider spreads in dealership style markets relative to auction style markets. For a sample of London Stock Exchange stocks, we find that preferenced trades pay higher...