In close interaction, group allocations are often fair due to our desire to betreated fairly and to act fairly. When this desire conflicts with other strong motivationsa typical reaction is to trade off fairness against these other concerns. Inequ(al)ity aversion allows capturing such trade off...

In the 40’s and early 50’ two decision theories were proposed and have since dominated the sceneof the fascinating field of decision-making. In 1944 – when von Neumann and Morgenstern showedthat if preferences are consistent with a set of axioms then it is possible to represent these...

To explain why pre-play communication increases cooperation in games,one refers to a) strategic causes such as efficient communication or reputationeffects, and b) changes in the utilities due to social processes. Hithertoexperimental support for both explanations is mixed and confounded....

We study the effects of leadership on the private provision of a public good when group members are heterogeneously endowed. Leadership is implemented as a sequential public goods game where one group member contributes first and all the others follow. Our results show that the presence of a...

We examine the publications of authors affiliated with an economics research institution in Canada in (i) the Top-10 journals in economics according to journals’ impact factors, and (ii) the Canadian Journal of Economics. We consider all publications in the even years from 1980 to 2000....

Myopic loss aversion (MLA) has been established as one prominentexplanation for the equity premium puzzle. In this paper we address two issuesrelated to the effects of MLA on risky investment decisions. First, we assess therelative impact of feedback frequency and investment flexibility (via...