The extent of stock option remuneration for executives has been strongly criticized due tonumerous cases of balance sheet manipulation in the USA. The (complete) incentive compatibilityof executive remuneration using stock options to the market value of the company is still a controversy.This...

The relationship between CEO pay and performance has been much analyzed in themanagement and economics literature. This study analyzes the structure of executivecompensation in family and non-family firms. In line with predictions of agency theory, it isfound that the share of base salary is...

In der öffentlichen Diskussion werden die Bezüge von Führungskräften mit der Semantikder Leistungsgerechtigkeit bewertet. Allerdings zeigt eine detaillierte Analysevon Prinzipal-Agent-Problemen in der modernen Wirtschaft, dass eine leistungsgerechteEntlohnung oft nicht das beste Ergebnis...

Um dem steigenden Wettbewerbsdruck standhalten und den veränderten Kundenwünschennachkommen zu können, wandeln sich viele Industrieunternehmen vom klassischen Produktzumumfassenden Lösungsanbieter, d.h. zum Erzeuger und Vermarkter so genannter hybriderProdukte.In diesem Arbeitspapier stehen...

A computational economics model of managerial compensation is presented. Risk-averse managers are simulated, and shown to adopt more risk-taking under the influence of stock options. It is also shown that stock options can both help a new entrant compete in an established market; and can help...

This paper examines the effect of using different option valuation models to calculatethe fair market value of Executive Stock Options (ESOs) granted to executivedirectors of UK firms. Our key objective is to demonstrate empirically that somecompanies will have greater incentive and benefit from...

We value UK executive stock options (ESOs) as American options that areawarded conditional on the probability of the holders achieving some performancecriteria. Unlike the standard Black and Scholes (BS) model, which is universally usedboth in the literature and practice, this provides a more...

This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...

A market-leveraged stock unit (MSU) is a form of employee compensation in which the number of shares received on the vesting date depends on the stock price at that time. MSUs have been proposed as a way of overcoming some of the drawbacks of stock options and restricted stock units. In this...