Prior research argues that a manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in the firm's stock price has a greater incentive to misreport. However, if the manager is risk-averse and misreporting increases both equity values and equity risk, the sensitivity of the manager's wealth to changes...

We study whether outside directors are held accountable for poor monitoring of executive compensation by examining the reputation penalties to directors of firms involved in the option backdating (BD) scandal of 2006–2007. We find that, at firms involved in BD, significant penalties accrued to...

Prior research argues that a manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in the firm׳s stock price has a greater incentive to misreport. However, if the manager is risk-averse and misreporting increases both equity values and equity risk, the sensitivity of the manager׳s wealth to...

In this paper, we study a setting where a firm (principal) is privately informed of the firm's potential and contracts with an agent to supply unobservable effort. We show it can be optimal for the firm to have loose monitoring in the sense that the monitoring system is less perfect than what is...

Contemporary investors worry more about firms' survival prospect than immediate financial gains. Analysts employ the use of short and long-term solvency tools to gauge the financial health of prospective firms. Often, these tools fail to generate the required information owing to their inherent...

The bankruptcy system plays an important role in resolving financial distress and reallocating resources in the economy. While many believe that transparency is central to an efficient bankruptcy system, the Bankruptcy Code lacks clear standards for disclosure and financial reporting. In this...