This paper establishes the result that the seller prefers posted-price selling when the cost of information acquisition is high, and auctions when it is low. We view corporate bonds as an instance of the former case, and government bonds as an instance of the latter.

This paper argues that intermediaries in decentralized markets can affect buyer welfare both directly, by reducing the expenses of buyers with high search cost but also indirectly, through a search-externality that affects the prices paid by those buyers that do not use intermediaries. These two...

We study the mechanism design problem for a seller of an indivisible good in a setting where privately informed buyers can acquire additional information and refine their valuations for the good at a cost. For this setting, we propose optimal (revenue-maximizing) and efficient...

This paper presents the results of an experiment performed to test the properties of an innovative bargaining mechanism (called automated negotiation) used to resolve disputes arising from Internetbased transactions. Automated negotiation is an online sealed-bid process in which an automated...

At equilibrium with respect to bids, entry and information acquisition, oral auctions can generate significantly more revenue than sealed-bid auctions even in the case of independently-distributed privately-known values

Using data on over 4,000 individual residential addresses, we find that geographic distance between directors and corporate headquarters is related to information acquisition and board decisions. The fraction of a board's unaffiliated directors who live near headquarters is higher when...

We propose a theory of asset prices that emphasizes heterogeneous information as the main element determining prices of different securities. Our main analytical innovation is in formulating a model of noisy information aggregation through asset prices, which is parsimonious and tractable, yet...

We propose a theory of asset prices that emphasizes heterogeneous information as the main element determining prices of different securities. Our main analytical innovation is in formulating a model of noisy information aggregation through asset prices, which is parsimonious and tractable, yet...

Using a rich sample of Canadian government securities auctions, we estimate the structural parameters of a share-auction model accounting for asymmetries across bidders. We find little evidence of asymmetries between participants at Canadian government nominal bond auctions. A counter-factual...

The study has attempted to empirically examine the efficiency of Govt. securities auction in Indian market. It is observed that prices of the securities under auction generally move downward between the date of announcement of auction and the date of auction. The yield, duration, issue size,...