This paper develops a tractable real options framework to analyze the eects of asym-metric information on investment and nancing decisions when rms require externalfunds to nance investment. Our analysis shows that corporate insiders can signal theirprivate information to outside investors using...

This paper examines the impact of agency conicts on corporate nancing decisions. Werst build a dynamic contingent claims model in which nancing policy results from a trade-obetween tax benets, contracting frictions, and agency conicts. In our setting, partially-entrenched managers set the rms'...

This paper examines the effects of capital gains taxation on firms’ investmentand financing decisions. We develop a real options model in which the timing ofinvestment, the decision to default, and the firm’s capital structure are endogenouslyand jointly determined. Our analysis demonstrates...

We develop a dynamic model of corporate investment and financing decisions in which corporate insiders have superior information about the firm's growth prospects. We show that firms with positive private information can credibly signal their type to outside investors using the timing of...

We develop a dynamic tradeoff model to examine the importance of manager-shareholder conflicts in capital structure choice. Using panel data on leverage choices and the model's predictions for different statistical moments of leverage, we show that while refinancing costs help explain the...

This paper analyzes the interaction between financial leverage and takeover activity. We develop a dynamic model of takeovers in which the financing strategies of bidding firms and the timing and terms of takeovers are jointly determined. In the paper, capital structure plays the role of a...