Information asymmetry is a necessary prerequisite for testing adverse selection. This paper applies this sequence of tests to Mauritian slave auctions. Dynamic auction theory with private value highlights more aggressive bidding by uninformed bidders and higher prices when an informed...

Reference–dependent preference models assume that agents derive utility from deviations of consumption from benchmark levels, rather than from consumption levels. These references can be either backward-looking (as explicit in the Habit literature) or forward-looking (as implicitly suggested...

Reference-dependent preference models assume that agents derive utility from deviations of consumption from benchmark levels, rather than from consumption levels. These references can be either backward-looking (as explicit in the Habit literature) or forward-looking (as implicitly suggested by...

We propose a consumption-based capital asset pricing model in which the representative agent's preferences display state-dependent risk aversion. We obtain a valuation equation in which the vector of excess on equity includes both consumption risk as well as the risk associated with variations...

This paper develops a two-sector, general equilibrium, overlapping generations model to study necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of private tutoring, when education is publicly provided. Young agents have heterogeneous endowments of human capital, which they can augment...

This paper studies the impact of family structures and elders' participation status on sectoral labor allocation in developing agricultural economies. In an overlapping generations framework with adult and old agents, we model a landlord's decision to hire adult apprentices and elder unskilled...

This paper develops a consumption-based asset pricing model in which attitudes towards risk are contingent upon the state of the world. For low (high) level of consumption relative to a subjective metric, counter-cyclical (pro-cyclical) risk aversion implies that consumption shocks generate...

This paper develops a model where two agents in different sectors face uncorrelated income risks and mutually self-insure. We discuss how the rent arising from risk pooling modifies the wage distribution in the sector where the employer behaves as a monopsonist.

Richer and healthier agents tend to hold riskier portfolios and spend proportionally less on health expenditures. Potential explanations include health and wealth effects on preferences, expected longevity or disposable total wealth. Using HRS data, we perform a structural estimation of a...

Evidence on adverse selection in slave markets remains inconclusive. A necessary prerequisite is that buyers and sellers have different information. We study informational asymmetry on the slave markets through notarial acts on public slave auctions in Mauritius between 1825 and 1835, involving...