collected through monitoring. We contribute to the experimental study of cooperation-enhancing institutions by examining how … cooperation and efficiency in a social dilemma change in response to varying how monitoring and punishment are jointly organized …. Specifically, we evaluate - against a no-monitoring baseline - combinations of two imperfect monitoring regimes (cen-tralized vs …

collected through monitoring. We contribute to the experimental study of cooperation-enhancing institutions by examining how … cooperation and efficiency in a social dilemma change in response to varying how monitoring and punishment are jointly organized …. Specifically, we evaluate - against a no-monitoring baseline - combinations of two imperfect monitoring regimes (cen-tralized vs …

understood. We study cooperation under different monitoring and communication structures in the laboratory. Under all monitoring … monitoring, where actions can only be observed with noise, cooperation is stable only when subjects can communicate before every …

understood. We study cooperation under different monitoring and communication structures in the laboratory. Under all monitoring … monitoring, where actions can only be observed with noise, cooperation is stable only when subjects can communicate before every …

We consider a repeated stochastic coordination game with imperfect public monitoring. In the game any pattern of …

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study the effect of a monitoring structure on the play of the infinitely … actions is perfect (perfect monitoring), noisy but public (public monitoring), and noisy and private (private monitoring). We … treatments. Specifically, we observe that the strategies are more complex under public and private monitoring than under perfect …

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study the effect of a monitoring structure on the play of the infinitely … actions is perfect (perfect monitoring), noisy but public (public monitoring), and noisy and private (private monitoring). We … treatments. Specifically, we observe that the strategies are more complex under public and private monitoring than under perfect …

This paper studies monitoring and punishment behavior by second and third parties in a cooperation experiment with … monitoring and punishment respond to changes in monitoring costs, and exploit the evidence to gain new insights about … commonalities and differences between second and third party behavior. We establish three effects of positive monitoring costs …

Recent experiments show that public goods can be provided at high levels when mutual monitoring and costly punishment … are allowed. All these experiments, however, study monitoring and punishment in a setting where all agents can monitor and …

Recent experiments show that public goods can be provided at high levels when mutual monitoring and costly punishment … are allowed. All these experiments, however, study monitoring and punishment in a setting where all agents can monitor and …