This paper analyzes the sequential admissions procedure for medical subjects at public universities in Germany. Complete information equilibrium outcomes are shown to be characterized by a \emph{stability} condition that is adapted to the \emph{institutional constraints} of the German system. I...

A common feature of the Hungarian, Irish, Spanish and Turkish higher education admission systems is that the students apply for programmes and they are ranked according to their scores. Students who apply for a programme with the same score are in a tie. Ties are broken by lottery in Ireland, by...

A central authority designs and implements the college admissions process in Turkey. All applicants are required to take an SAT-like test and submit their preferences over the departments. Then, the central authority places the applicants in departments by considering the test scores and stated...

We introduce a college admission with tuition transfers problem. In this novel formulation, students' payments are not necessarily equal to their respective tuition fees. However, the total requested tuition fees must be equal to the total payment burden on students. We introduce two mechanism...

We study a dynamic two-sided many-to-one matching model that generalizes the college admissions problem. A dynamically stable matching does not generally exist. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a dynamically stable matching and show that some but not all results for the...

This paper develops a method for identifying and estimating student preferences in centralized matching mechanisms when students are ranked by exam scores. In these mechanisms, exam scores contain important information for inferring students' heterogeneous preferences because students have...

We study many-to-one matching with complementarities. Real life examples include college admissions with two-sided monetary transfers, teacher assignment with different teaching loads, worker assignment. Due to the presence of complementarities, the conditions that are essential for the...

This paper proposes a practical and data-driven preference estimation method from reported lists in a Deferred Acceptance mechanism when there are incentives to report these lists strategically. Data on centralized college admissions from Turkey show many pieces of evidence that students...

We study multi-period college admission problems where, at each period, a matching is computed and students have option to either finalize their matches or participate to the next period. Students participating to an additional run of the matching mechanism can submit a new preference list to...

Although Gale-Shapley’s student optimal stable matching mechanism (SOSM) has desirable properties, it is infeasible for college admissions in a large market because it is impossible to ask every student to provide a complete ranking of thousands of colleges. Regarding college admissions...