The paper provides a tractable, analytical framework to study regulatory risk underoptimal incentive regulation. Regulatory risk is captured by uncertainty about thepolicy variables in the regulator’s objective function: weights attached to profits andcosts of public funds. Results are as...

The purpose of this paper is to propose a new likelihood-based panel cointegration testin the presence of a linear time trend in the data generating process. This new test is an extensionof the likelihood ratio (LR) test of Saikkonen & L¨utkepohl (2000) for trend-adjusteddata to the panel data...

This paper presents a new approach to deriving default intensities from CDS or bond spreadsthat yields smooth intensity curves required e.g. for pricing or risk management purposes. Assumingcontinuous premium or coupon payments, the default intensity can be obtained by solving an...

Systemic weather risk is a major obstacle for the formation of private (non-subsidized) crop insurance. This paper explores the possibility of spatial diversication ofinsurance by estimating the joint occurrence of unfavorable weather conditions in dierentlocations. For that purpose copula...

Weather inuences our daily lives and choices and has an enormous impact on corporate revenues andearnings. Weather derivatives dier from most derivatives in that the underlying weather cannot be tradedand their market is relatively illiquid. The weather derivative market is therefore incomplete....

We study the effects of envy on the feasibility of relational contracts in a standard moral hazard setup with two agents. Performance is evaluated via an observable, but non-contractible signal which reflects the agent's individual contribution to form value. Both agents exhibit disadvantageous...

With adverse selection, diseconomies of scale associated with hierarchies may induce the implementation of a second-best technology. This occurs whenever rents to lower tiers of the hierarchy increase faster than total surplus. This is more likely with longer hierarchies.

The current study investigates a tripartite incentive contract between an innovator supplying an intellectual asset, a professional assigned to productive tasks, and a consulting firm specializing in matching ideas and professionalskills. A rather simple pure tripartite partnership implements...

In this paper, we provide an outlook for further research on the topic of governance. We review four different approaches on the theory of the firm and discuss implications for governance, namely; nexus of contracts / agency theory, property rights /incomplete contracts, adaptation, and nexus of...

We use a static framework characterized by both moral hazard and holdup problems. In the model the optimal allocation of bargaining power balances these frictions. We examine the impact of improved monitoring on that optimal allocation and its impact upon effort, investment, profits and rents....