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Optimal tolerance for failure
Siegert, Caspar; Trepper, Piers - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 109 (2015) C, pp. 41-55
We consider the problem of an employer who has to choose whether to reemploy agents with a positive track record or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011190118
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Loss aversion and learning to bid
Dittrich, Dennis Alexis Valin; Güth, Werner; Kocher, Martin - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005
Bidding challenges learning theories since experiences with the same bid vary stochastically:the same choice can result … learning theories. Our experimental results suggest that a version of reinforcementlearning which accounts for loss aversion …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866949
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Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: The-ory and Experimental Evidence
Gürtler, Oliver; Harbring, Christine - 2007
In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals in-termediate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333966
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Performance appraisals and the impact of forced distribution: An experimental investigation
Berger, Johannes; Harbring, Christine; Sliwka, Dirk - 2010
A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in turn receive a bonus payment based on these ratings. We compare a baseline treatment in which supervisors were not restricted in their rating behavior to a forced distribution...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269805
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Performance appraisals and the impact of forced distribution : an experimental investigation
Berger, Johannes; Harbring, Christine; Sliwka, Dirk - 2010
A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in turn receive a bonus payment based on these ratings. We compare a baseline treatment in which supervisors were not restricted in their rating behavior to a forced distribution...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003981608
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Feedback in Tournaments Under Commitment Problems : Theory and Experimental Evidence
Gürtler, Oliver; Harbring, Christine - 2021
In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals intermediate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316760
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Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: The-ory and Experimental Evidence
Gürtler, Oliver; Harbring, Christine - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals in-termediate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785932
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Performance Appraisals and the Impact of Forced Distribution : An Experimental Investigation
Berger, Johannes - 2010
A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in turn receive a bonus payment based on these ratings. We compare a baseline treatment in which supervisors were not restricted in their rating behavior to a forced distribution...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013141429
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Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Gürtler, Oliver; Harbring, Christine - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007
In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals intermediate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822892
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Performance Appraisals and the Impact of Forced Distribution: An Experimental Investigation
Berger, Johannes; Harbring, Christine; Sliwka, Dirk - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010
A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in turn receive a bonus payment based on these ratings. We compare a baseline treatment in which supervisors were not restricted in their rating behavior to a forced distribution...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008557231