Consumer credit is now often instantly available on E-commerce platforms. This paper incorporates the liquidity provision into the consideration of platform competition. A platform needs to strike a balance between consumer rebates and consumer credit. We show that if there is an insufficient...

This paper builds a new model of financial exchange competition, tailored to the institutional details of the modern US stock market. In equilibrium, exchange trading fees are competitive but exchanges are able to earn economic profits from the sale of speed technology. We document stylized...

This paper examines how the degree of interbank competition affects real economic growth, growth patterns, and consumer welfare using a dynamical systems approach. Risk averse agents insure against idiosyncratic risk via deposit contracts that maximize bank profits. These contracts are derived...

The existing literature on "two-sided markets" addresses participation externalities, but so far it has neglected pecuniary externalities between competing platforms. In this paper we build a model that incorporates both externalities. In our setup differentiated platforms compete in advertising...

We examine two episodes of strategic interaction in the U.K. betting industry: (i) Betfair (an entrant multi-sided platform, or MSP) vs. Flutter (also an MSP), and (ii) Betfair vs. traditional bookmakers. We find that although Betfair was an underfunded second mover in the betting exchange...

In many markets, user benefits depend on participation and usage decisions of other users giving rise to network effects. Intermediaries manage these network effects and thus act as platforms that bring users together. This paper reviews key findings from the literature on network effects and...

This paper analyzes exclusionary conduct of platforms in two-sided markets. Motivated by recent antitrust cases against shopping centers introducing radius restrictions on their tenants, we provide a discussion of the likely positive and normative effects of exclusivity clauses, which prevent...

This paper analyses a two-sided market in which two platforms compete against each other. One side, the advertisers, exerts a negative externality on the ther side, the users. It is shown that if platforms can charge advertisers only, a higher degree of competition for users can lead to higher...

For many products, platforms enable sellers to transact with buyers. We show that the competitive conditions among sellers shape the market structure in platform industries. If product market competition is tough, sellers avoid competitors by joining different platforms. This allows platforms to...