A unique indivisible commodity with an unknown common value is owned bygroup of individuals and should be allocated to one of them while compensating theothers monetarily. We study the so-called fair division game (Güth, Ivanova-Stenzel,Königstein, and Strobel (2002, 2005)) theoretically and...

In this paper we experimentally test skewness seeking at the individuallevel. Several prospects that can be ordered with respect to the third-degreestochastic dominance (3SD) criterion are ranked by the participants of theexperiment. We find that the skewness of a distribution has a...

This note provides the details of the estimation procedure in Br¨unner (2019). In Section 2 we derive the posterior distribution. Section 3 describes the MCMC algorithm used to obtain draws from the posterior distribution and in Section 4 we present the method for our model check. We conclude...

In a fair division game an indivisible object with an unknown common value is owned by a group of individuals and should be allocated to one of them while the others are compensated monetarily. Implementing fair division games in the lab, we fi nd many occurrences of the winner's curse under the...

A unique indivisible commodity with an unknown common value is owned by group of individuals and should be allocated to one of them while compensating the others monetarily. We study the so-called fair division game (Güth, Ivanova-Stenzel, Königstein, and Strobel (2002, 2005)) theoretically...

In this paper we experimentally test skewness seeking at the individual level. Several prospects that can be ordered with respect to the third-degree stochastic dominance (3SD) criterion are ranked by the participants of the experiment. We ¯nd that the skewness of a distribution has a...

The unmediated call auction is a useful trading mechanism to aggregate dispersed information. Its ability to incorporate information of a single informed insider, however, is less well understood. We analyse this question by presenting a simple call auction game where both auction prices and...

The present study contributes to the ongoing debate on possible costs and benefits of insider trading. We present a novel call auction model with insider information. Our model predicts that more insider information improves informational efficiency of prices, but this comes at the expense of...

Purpose: This study aims to investigate – theoretically and empirically – if call auctions incorporate asymmetric information into prices. Design/methodology/approach: First, this study introduces a new model of price formation in a call auction with insider information. In this call...