Rational Expectations (RE) models have two crucial dimensions: 1) agents correctly forecast future prices given all available information, and 2) given expectations, agents solve optimization problems and these solutions in turn determine actual price realizations. Experimental testing of such...

Rational Expectations (RE) models have two crucial dimensions: agents correctly forecast future prices given all available information, and given expectations, agents solve optimization problems and these solutions in turn determine actual price realizations. Experimental testing of such models...

Experimental social scientists working at research-intensive institutions deal inevitably with subjects who have most likely participated in previous experiments. It is an important methodological question to know whether participants that have acquired a high level of lab-sophistication show...

Crockett, Spear and Sunder [2005] propose an algorithm whereby boundedly rational agents with standard neoclassical preferences learn competitive equilibrium in a repeated static exchange economy. In this paper, a laboratory market is instituted to examine the hypothesis that people are at least...

In this paper, I present an empirical model of learning under ambiguity in the context of clinical trials. Patients are concern with learning the treatment effect of the experimental drug, but face the ambiguity of random group assignment. A two dimensional Bayesian model of learning is proposed...

E-nstructions facilitates the use of electronic instructions in computerized laboratory ex-periments in social sciences. In this article I provide a set of guidelines for the installationand the use of E-nstructions.