People behave pro-socially in a wide variety of situations that standard economic theory is unable to explain. Social comparison is one explanation for such pro-social behavior: people contributeif others contribute or cooperate as well....

Consider a setting in which several groups of individuals with common interests ("clubs")compete with each other for recognition by other individuals. Depending on the context,recognition may be expressed by these other individuals joining a club, or choosing one clubto admire. Clubs compete by...

Over the last decades, empirical research on subjective well-being in the socialsciences has provided a major new stimulus to the discourse on individual happiness.Recently this research has also been linked to economics where reported subjective wellbeingis often taken as a proxy measure for...

We use data from over 20,000 firms in 60 countries to identify constraints on the growth offirms. We interpret managers´ answers to survey questions on the extent to which variousaspects of their external environment inhibit the performance of their firm as measuring theshadow cost of...

In public good provision, privileged groups enjoy the advantage that some of its membersfind it optimal to supply a positive amount of the public good. However, their inherentasymmetric nature may make the enforcement of cooperative behavior through informalsanctioning harder to accomplish...

Costly signaling of commitment to a group has been proposed as an explanation forparticipation in religion and ritual. But if the signal’s cost is too small, freeriders willsend the signal and behave selfishly later. Effective signaling may then be prohibitivelycostly. If the average level of...

Idiosyncratic risk attitudes are usually assumed to be commonly knownand restricted to own payos. However, the alternatives faced by a decisionmaker often involve risks for others' payos as well. Motivated by theimportance of other-regarding preferences in social interactions, this paperexplores...

We present a rigorous, yet elementary, demonstration of the existence of a uniqueLindahl equilibrium under the assumptions that characterize the standard n-player public goodmodel. Indeed, our approach, which exploits the aggregative structure of the public goodmodel, lends itself to a...

We extend the simple model of voluntary public good provision toallow for two or more public goods, and explore the new possibilitiesthat arise in this setting. We show that, when there are many publicgoods, voluntary contrib...

We exploit a controlled frameless laboratory experiment to study settlement negoti-ations and the plainti¤’s decision to raise a lawsuit in case of an impasse. We …nd thatgreater variance in court outcomes increases the litigation rate and lowers the settlementrate. This latter …nding goes...