The Nash Bargaining problem in the context of a random utility modelyields a stochastic demand for each player, conditional on his or her beliefs re-garding the other player's behavior. We derive a symmetric logit equilibriumunder naive expectations that converges to the Nash axiomatic solution...

We study an ultimatum experiment in which the responder does not know the offer when accepting or rejecting. Unconditional veto power leads to acceptances, although proposers are significantly greedier than in standard ultimatum games, and this is anticipated by responders.

Hegemony is a central feature of contemporary international politicsbut it remains seriously under-theorized. We draw on cooperative game theoryto represent and analyze different aspects of hegemony. After developing ageneral conception of hegemony, we analyze the circumstances under which...

We report on an experiment designed to explore the interrelation of otherregardingconcerns with attitudes towards risk and delay when the latterhave a social dimension, i.e., pertain to one's own and another person'spayos. For this sake, we compare evaluations of several prospects, eachof which...

We study a market in which both buyers and sellers can decide to preempt and set theirquantities before market clearing. Will this lead to preemption on both sides of the market,only one side of the market, or to no preemption at all? We …nd that preemption tends to beasymmetric in the sense...

In close interaction, group allocations are often fair due to our desire to betreated fairly and to act fairly. When this desire conflicts with other strong motivationsa typical reaction is to trade off fairness against these other concerns. Inequ(al)ity aversion allows capturing such trade off...

In this paper, we apply the bounded rationality approach to aninvestment situation. In a simple setting where an investor decides betweena riskless bond and a risky asset, we distinguish three aspirationlevels: a lowest threshold that one wants to guarantee, an aspirationlevel given by investing...

In one-shot investment game experiments where each player's payo is a convexcombination of own and other's prot, trust remains unaected by the extent of interdependencewhereas trustworthiness reacts positively to it.

To explain why pre-play communication increases cooperation in games,one refers to a) strategic causes such as efficient communication or reputationeffects, and b) changes in the utilities due to social processes. Hithertoexperimental support for both explanations is mixed and confounded....

This paper analyzes vertical cross-shareholding, that is, the mutual holding of a minority of shares between vertically related firms. We investigate the conditions under which cross-shareholding improves efficiency. First, we explore the issue in a game-theoretic model and find that...