Completeness, the most commonly assumed axiom in preference theory,has not received much attention from the experimental literature. Indeed,incomplete preferences model a cognitive phenomenon (an agent's inabilityto compare alternatives), and therefore cannot be directly revealed throughchoice...

Completeness, the most commonly assumed axiom in preference theory, has not received much attention from the experimental literature. Indeed, incomplete preferences model a cognitive phenomenon (an agent's inability to compare alternatives), and therefore cannot be directly revealed through...

We propose an experimental design allowing a behavioral test of the axiom of completeness of individual preferences. The central feature of our design consists in enabling subjects to postpone commitment at a small cost. Our main result is that preferences are significantly incomplete. We use...

We report three repetitions of Falk and Kosfeld's (2006) low and medium control treatmentswith 364 subjects. Each repetition employs a sample drawn from a standard subject pool ofstudents and demographics vary across samples. Our results largely conict with those of theoriginal study. We mainly...

We revisit the economic models of social learning by assuming that individuals update theirbeliefs in a non-Bayesian way. Individuals either overweigh or underweigh (in Bayesian terms)their private information relative to the public information revealed by the decisions of othersand each...

We study two person-betting games with inconsistent commonly know beliefs, using an experimentalapproach. In our experimental games, participants bet against one another, each bettorchoosing one of two possible outcomes, and payoff odds are know at the time bets are placed.Bettors’ beliefs are...