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A voluntary contribution experiment with one-waycommunication and income heterogeneity

Koukoumelis, Anastasios; Levati, Maria Vittoria; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2010

One-way communication has been found to substantially increasecontributions in linear voluntary contribution mechanisms. We confirmthe robustness of this result in the presence of income heterogeneity.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248898

Planning ahead: eliciting intentions and beliefsin a public goods game

Gonzales, Luis G.; Levati, Vittoria - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2007

In a two-person finitely repeated public goods experiment, we use intentionsdata to interpret individual behavior. Based on a random-utilitymodel specification, we develop a relationship between a player's beliefsabout others' behavior and his contributions' plans, and use this relationshipto...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866468

Listen: I am angry!An experiment comparing ways of revealing emotions

Güth, Werner; Levati, Vittoria - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2007

We report on an experiment designed to explore whether allowing individualsto voice their anger prevents costly punishment. For this sake, weuse an ultimatum minigame and distinguish two treatments: one in whichresponders can only accept or reject the o®er, and the other in which theycan also...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866528

The Blues Goes On But When Does It Stop?- Public Goods Experiments with Non-Denite andNon-Commonly Known Time Horizons

Gonzalez, Luis G.; Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2004

A robust nding of repeated public goods experiments is that high initialcontribution rates sharply decline towards the end. This paper reports onan exploratory experiment designed to discover whether such a decline is simply triggered by the usual experimental practice of publicly informing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866812

Privately Contributing to Public Goods over Time¤- An Experimental Study

Güth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Stiehler, Andreas - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002

Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participantscan vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing apublic good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contributiongradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867324

Leading by example with and without exclusionpower in voluntary contribution experiments

Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Sutter, Matthias; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006

We examine the effects of leading by example in voluntary contributionexperiments. Leadership is implemented by letting …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866642

Leading by example in a public goods experiment with heterogeneity and incomplete information

Levati, Maria Vittoria; Sutter, Matthias; Heijden, … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

We study the effects of leadership on the private provision of a public good when group members are heterogeneously … endowed. Leadership is implemented as a sequential public goods game where one group member contributes first and all the … of homogeneous endowments. Leadership is almost ineffective, though, if subjects do not know the distribution of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866855

Social identity and trust - An experimental investigation

Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Ploner, Matteo - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006

We experimentally examine how group identity affects trust behaviorin an investment game. In one treatment, group identity isinduced purely by minimal groups. In other treatments, group membersare additionally related by outcome interdependence establishedin a prior public goods game. Moving...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866633

Ex Interim Voting in Public Good Provision

Fischer, Sven; Nicklisch, Andreas - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006

We report the results of an experimental study that compares voting mechanismsin the provision of public goods. Subjects can freely decide how much they want tocontribute. Whether the public good is finally provided is decided by a referendumunder full information about all contributions. If...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866711

Are cooperators efficiency- or fair-minded?Evidence from a public goods experiment

Levati, Maria Vittoria; Ploner, Matteo; Traub, Stefan - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2007

We use a two-person public goods experiment to distinguish betweene±ciency and fairness as possible motivations for cooperative behavior.Asymmetric marginal per capita returns allow only the high-productivityplayer to increase group payo®s when contributing positive amounts....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866570

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