Similar Search Results

Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments

Neugebauer, Tibor; Perote, Javier; Schmidt, Ulrich; … - 2007

In the recent literature, several hypotheses have been put forward in order to explain the decline of contributions in repeated public good games. We present results of an experiment which allows to evaluate these hypotheses. The main characteristics of our experimental design are a variation of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272953

Another hidden cost of incentives: The detrimental effect on norm enforcement

Fuster, Andreas; Meier, Stephan - 2009

Monetary incentives are often considered as a way to foster contributions to public goods in society and firms. This paper investigates experimentally the effect of monetary incentives in the presence of a norm enforcement mechanism. Norm enforcement through peer punishment has been shown to be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010280907

The conditional contribution mechanism for repeated public goods : the general case

Oechssler, Joerg; Reischmann, Andreas; Sofianos, Andis - 2019

We present a new and simple mechanism for repeated public good environments. In the Conditional Contribution Mechanism (CCM), agents send two message of the form, "I am willing to contribute x units to the public good if in total y units are contributed." This mechanism offers agents risk-free...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012104827

The dos and don'ts of leadership in sequential public goods experiments

Rivas, Maria Fernanda; Sutter, Matthias - 2008

We study the effects of leadership in the provision of public goods by examining (i) the relative importance of reward … and punishment as leadership devices, (ii) whether endogenous leadership is more efficient than exogenously enforced … leadership, and (iii) whether leaders contributing last, instead of first, also increase contributions. The experimental results …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293401

Can communication mitigate strategic delays in investment timing?

Mermer, Ayse; Onderstal, Sander; Sonnemans, Joep - 2023

In economic environments, decision-makers can strategically delay irreversible investments to learn from the actions of others. This creates free-riding incentives and can lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. We experimentally examine if and how communication mitigates this free-riding problem...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014299600

The conditional contribution mechanism for repeated public goods: The general case

Oechssler, Joerg; Reischmann, Andreas; Sofianos, Andis - 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012109314

Birth, Death and Public Good Provision

Duffy, John; Lafky, Jonathan - Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh - 2014

We explore the effect of fixed versus dynamic group membership on public good provision. In a novel experimental design, we modify the traditional voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) by periodically replacing old members of a group with new members over time. Under this dynamic, overlapping...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010878538

Group Membership, Team Preferences, and Expectations (This is a new version of CEEL WP 6-09)

Guala, Francesco; Mittone, Luigi; Ploner, Matteo - Dipartimento di Economia e Management, Università … - 2012

Group membership increases cooperation in social dilemma games, altruistic donation in dictator games, and fair offers in ultimatum games. While the empirical study of group action has grown rapidly over the years, there is little agreement at the theoretical level on exactly why and how group...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010550536

An Application of the English Clock Market Mechanism to Public Goods Games

Levati, Maria Vittoria; Neugebauer, Tibor - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2001

We conducted a laboratory study with a public goods game in which contributions are not submitted all at once but incrementally as coordinated in real time by a clock. Individuals press a button as soon as the clock equals their willingness to contribute. This public goods institution exploits...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765099

Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments

Neugebauer, Tibor; Perote, Javier; Schmidt, Ulrich; … - EconWPA - 2005

The recent literature suggests that people have social preferences with a self-serving bias. Our data analysis reveals that the stylized fact of declining cooperation in repeated public goods experiments results from this bias and adaptation.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125603