In this paper, we propose a model of credit rating agencies using the global games framework to incorporate information and coordination problems. We introduce a refined utility function of a credit rating agency that, additional to reputation maximization, also embeds aspects of competition and...

Do rating agencies increase or decrease financial market stability? This paper analyzes whether credit rating agencies may help to avoid inefficient self-fulfilling credit defaults. If investors follow risk-dominant strategies, we show that rating announcements and investors' private information...

We develop a model of credit rating agencies (CRAs) based on reputation concerns. Ratings a ffect investors' choice and, thereby, also issuers' access to funding and default risk. We show that in equilibrium - the informational content of credit ratings is inferior to that of CRAs' private...

Generally, information provision and certification have been identified as the major economic functions of rating agencies. This paper analyzes whether the 'watchlist (rating review) instrument has extended the agencies' role towards a monitoring position, as proposed by Boot, Milbourn, and...

Generally, information provision and certification have been identified as the major economic functions of rating agencies. This paper analyzes whether the watchlist" (rating review) Instrument has extended the agencies' role towards a monitoring position, as proposed by Boot, Milbourn, and...

This paper assesses whether ratings or market-based credit risk measures are more suitable forformulating portfolio governance rules. Such rules, which consist of buy and sell restrictions,are commonly used in investment management. Based on data from 1983 to 2002, it is notevident that one of...

Using a structural model of default, I derive rating characteristics if ratings are meant tolook ‘through the cycle’ as opposed to being based on the borrowers’ current condition.The through-the-cycle method, which is employed by most rating agencies, requires aseparation of permanent and...

We use dynamic panel analysis to examine whether credit rating agencies achieve what they claim to achieve, namely, look into the future when assigning their ratings. We find that Moodey's ratings help predict individual financial ratios over a horizon of up to five years. Ratings also predict a...

Surveys on the use of agency credit ratings reveal that most investors believe that rating agencies are relatively slow in adjusting their ratings. (...)

We develop a model of credit rating agencies (CRAs) based on reputation concerns. Ratings affect investors' choice and, thereby, also issuers' access to funding and default risk. We show that - in equilibrium - the informational content of credit ratings is inferior to that of CRAs' private...