This paper identifies types of tax evaders and explores their divergent motivations for evading taxation. The data derives from two large-scale population surveys conducted in 2008 and 2012 in Hungary. Cluster analysis captured two distinct types of tax evaders: 1) poverty escape-type and 2)...

Tax evasion costs government over 400 billion dollars a year. We suggest enforcement efforts can be strengthened by redesigning the tax return to take advantage of social psychology research, and industry experience with data-driven systems. To illustrate the potential of this approach, in this...

The cash economy and associated tax evasion is an on-going issue for most tax administrators. Tax evasion reduces national tax revenue, shifts the tax burden on to other taxpayers such as salary/wage earners and undermines confidence in the tax system affecting voluntary compliance as well as...

Each year, the government loses hundreds of billions of dollars in tax revenue due to underreporting by individual taxpayers. According to standard deterrence theory, policymakers should be able to reduce tax evasion by increasing tax penalties, raising the audit rate, or some combination of the...

Some noncompliant taxpayers fall outside the reach of third-party withholding and reporting. Revenue agencies may use enforcement and/or prosocial strategies to encourage compliance among such taxpayers. Revenue agencies should stand ready to use narrative as part of these efforts, despite...

The emerging evidence from developing countries suggests that the costs of evasion there are roughly a reverse-L-shaped function of earnings: they are extremely low up to a given threshold and then rise sharply with evasion. Embedding such evasion costs into the standard model generates a...

Private property income can only be reported by letter and not on a Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) T1 form. Only income deemed by law to be Canada's “public money” is filed on a T1. CRA uses the SIN two ways: as a Social Insurance Number and also as a “social insurance number” to...

This paper models corporate tax evasion as a game among three players: tax authorities, shareholders and the manager in order to understand the behavior of corporate tax evasion (CTE), its causes and the possible mechanisms that can alleviate it. For this purpose, a three-level programming is...

We relate tax evasion behavior to a substantial literature on self and social comparison in judgements. Tax payers engage in tax evasion as a means to boost their expected consumption relative to others in their “local” social network, and relative to past consumption. The unique Nash...

We relate tax evasion behavior to a substantial literature on self and social comparison in judgements. Taxpayers engage in tax evasion as a means to boost their expected consumption relative to others in their "local" social network, and relative to past consumption. The unique Nash equilibrium...