Two firms compete on a sales market as well as in hiring labor. The duopolists'sales levels depend on their workforce. There are two each of two typesof workers, mobile and immobile, with differing effort costs. An immobileworker's eort costs are lower when he is employed by the local firm,...

Bereits im Jahre 1980 wählte Horst Albach einen spieltheoretischen und experimentellökonomischenZugang zum Vertrauensproblem in der Ökonomik. Dieser Weg wird erneutbeschritten. Es wird aufgezeigt, dass neuere spieltheoretische und experimentelle Arbeitennicht nur die explanativen Grenzen des...

The common prior assumption justifies private beliefs as posterior probabilities when updatinga common prior based on individual information. Common priors are pervasive in most economicmodels of incomplete information and oligopoly models with asymmetrically informed firms. Wedispose of the...

We investigate experimentally whether entry costs have an impact on the evolutionof cooperation in a social dilemma game. In particular, subjects repeatedly playthe so-called takeover game with anonymous partners randomly drawn from a fixedpopulation of participants. The game represents a social...

We examine the effects of leading by example in voluntary contributionexperiments. Leadership is implemented by letting one group membercontribute to the public good before followers do. Such leadershipincreases contributions in comparison to the standard voluntary contributionmechanism,...

In a stochastic duopoly market, sellers must form state-specific aspirationsexpressing how much they want to earn given their expectationsabout the other's behavior. We define individually and mutually satisficingsales behavior for given individual beliefs and aspiration profiles. In afirst...

There is robust field data showing that a frequent and successful way of looking fora job is via the intermediation of friends and relatives. Here we want to explore thisexperimentally. Participants first play a simple public good game with two interactionpartners ("friends"), and share whatever...

We experimentally explore individual and interactive decision making ina sequential search task and test whether generally accepted principles ofbounded rationality (aspiration formation, satisficing, and aspiration adjustment)adequately explain the observed search behavior. Subjects can, at...

In the Yes/No game, like in the ultimatum game, proposer and respondercan share a monetary reward. In both games the proposer suggests a rewarddistribution which the responder can accept or reject (yielding 0-payoffs). Thegames only differ in that the responder does (not) learn the suggested...

Standard economic explanations of good conduct in trade rely almostexclusively on future-directed extrinsic motivations induced by materialincentives. But intrinsic motives to behave trustworthy and to punishuntrustworthiness do support trade. In our model, intrinsically motivatedplayers are...