The paper analyzes how cooperation in a repeated social game may help to sustain cooperation in a "linked" repeated production game. We show that this may happen a) because of available "social capital," defined as the slack of punishment power present in the social repeated game; b) because,...

We study the impact of changes in the commitment power of a principal on cooperation among agents, in a model in which the principal and her agents are symmetrically uncertain about the agents' innate abilities. When the principal cannot commit herself to long-term wage contracts, two types of...

Purpose – To learn to avoid pitfalls there is need to accept and understand failures. This anonymous case study aims to report a major organisational failure due to the absence of effective knowledge management, where both the reasons for, and organisational consequences of, the failure are...

In the process of organizational adaptation to environmental demands, primarily through the anticipated outputs, human resources play a key role. The procuring of necessary human resources, their working commitment and development, are the basic assignments of the management of human resources....

According to conventional wisdom, a middle manager is useless to a principal that has enough time, attention, and technical expertise to oversee all organizational activities. This paper argues that such a principal can benefit from a manager's services, and that her optimal choice of manager...

Does the matching between workers and jobs help explain productivity differentials across firms? To address this question we develop a job-worker allocation quality measure (JAQ) by combining employer-employee administrative data with machine learning techniques. The proposed measure is...

This study examines how control elements of a firm affect managerial decision making. The firm operates a network of 59 profit centers. It uses a transfer-pricing system designed to deal with externalities individual profit centers can impose on other profit centers. Further, profit center...

We analyze the Moral Hazard problem, assuming that agents are inequity averse. Our results differ from conventional contract theory and are more in line with empirical findings than standard results. We find: First, inequity aversion alters the structure of optimal contracts. Second, there is a...

We provide an explanation for peer pressure in teams based on inequity aversion. Analyzing a two-period model with two agents, we find that the effect of inequity aversion strongly depends on the information structure. When contributions are unobservable, agents act as if they were purely...

Does the matching between workers and jobs help explain productivity differentials across firms? To address this question we develop a job-worker allocation quality measure (JAQ) by combining employer-employee administrative data with machine learning techniques. The proposed measure is...