We analyze the impact of a uniform price cap at electricity spot markets on firms investmentdecisions and on welfare. Since investment decisions for those markets are taken in the longrun, fluctuating demand at the spot market eventually gives rise to high price spikes in case ofbinding...

Cap and trade mechanisms enjoy increasing importance in environmental legislations worldwide. One of the important aspects of designing cap and trade mechanisms is the possibility of authorities to grant emission permits for free. Unlike analyzed in the seminal contributions on cap and trade...

We analyze the effect of price caps on equilibrium production and welfare in oligopoly under demand uncertainty. We find that high price caps always increase production and welfare as compared to the situation without price cap. Price caps close to marginal cost may lead to zero production,...

We analyze a market game where firms choose capacities under uncertainty about future market conditions and make output choices after uncertainty has unraveled. We show existence and uniqueness of equilibrium under imperfect competition and establish that capacity choices by strategic firms are...

In this paper we propose a three-level computational equilibrium model that allows to analyze the impact of the regulatory environment on transmission line expansion (by the regulator) and investment in generation capacity (by private firms) in liberalized electricity markets. The basic model...