We study optimal securitization in the presence of an initial moral hazard. A financial intermediary creates and then sells to outside investors defaultable assets, whose default risk is determined by the unobservable costly effort exerted by the intermediary. We calculate the optimal contract...

This paper presents an equilibrium model in a pure exchange economy when investors have three possible sources of heterogeneity. Investors may differ in their beliefs, in their level of risk aversion and in their time preference rate. We study the impact of investors heterogeneity on the...

We calculate equilibria of dynamic double-auction markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information. Over time, agents are privately informed by bids and offers. Investors are segmented into groups that differ with respect to characteristics determining information...

We study survival, price impact and portfolio impact in heterogeneous economies. We show that, under the equilibrium risk-neutral measure, long-run price impact is in fact equivalent to survival, whereas longrun portfolio impact is equivalent to survival under an agent-specific, wealth-forward...

We provide a representation for the nonmyopic optimal portfolio of an agent consuming only at the terminal horizon when the single state variable follows a general diffusion process and the market consists of one risky asset and a risk-free asset. The key term of our representation is a new...

We calculate learning rates when agents are informed through both public and private observation of other agents' actions. We provide an explicit solution for the evolution of the distribution of posterior beliefs. When the private learning channel is present, we show that convergence of the...

We study survival, price impact, and portfolio impact in heterogeneous economies. We show that, under the equilibrium risk-neutral measure, long-run price impact is in fact equivalent to survival, whereas long-run portfolio impact is equivalent to survival under an agent-specific, wealth-forward...

We develop a model of investment, payout, and nancing policies in which rms face uncertainty regarding their ability to raise funds and have to search for investors when in need of capital. We show that capital supply uncertainty leads rms to value nancial slack and to adjust their policies to...

We study equilibria of dynamic over-the-counter markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information. Over time, agents are privately informed by bids and offers. Investors differ with respect to information quality, including initial information precision, and also in...