We show that if patent protection and trade secrecy generate asymmetricmarket structure, an innovator may prefer patent protection than trade secrecy even ifthe diffusion probability is higher under the former but it increases marketconcentration by preventing some imitators...

We show the effect of patent protection on R&D investment in presence of‘inventing around’ (or imitation) and technology licensing...

It is usually believed that innovation increases profits of the firms and alsosocial welfare. In a duopoly model with product innovation, we show that both thesebelieve may go wrong. We show that if the cost of innovation is not very large,prisoner’s dilemma occurs under product innovation,...

This paper considers welfare effects of entry when the incumbent firmbehaves like a Stackelberg leader in the product market. In contrast to previous work(Klemperer, 1988, Journal of Industrial Economics), we show that entry may alwaysincrease welfare. Using general demand function, we show the...

We consider the effects of product market cooperation on R&Dinvestment, profits, consumer surplus and welfare. We show that though R&Dinvestment, consumer surplus and social welfare may be higher or lower underproduct market cooperation than product market competition, industry profit isalways...

We show that a monopolist input supplier licenses its technology to create a second source of input supply if second sourcing increases competition in the final goods market. We also show that welfare increases under second sourcing...

In a recent paper Mujumder (2004, Economics Letters) argued that only if the industry is a monopoly, we could be certain that the government could use profit tax to make up any shortfall in tariff revenue and also make the consumers and producers better off. We show that this result is not...

This paper shows that if number of firms is determined endogenously, Cournot competition generates higher welfare compared to Bertrand competition when products are sufficiently differentiated. If products are close substitutes, welfare is higher under Bertrand competition. We show that the...

This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a horizontallydifferentiated duopoly market with non-tournament R&D competition. We consider thatsuccess in R&D is uncertain. We show that whether firms invest more under Cournotcompetition or Bertrand competition is ambiguous and depends on...

This paper shows the possibility of higher welfare under Cournot competitionin an asymmetric cost duopoly when the firms have the option for technology licensing.We find that if there is licensing with up-front fixed-fee, welfare is higher under Cournotcompetition compared to Bertrand...