This paper deals with a special hold-up problem in privatization.

The paper compares the productive efficiency of public and private enterprises in an adverse selection model with managerial effort. Under either ownership structure, the firm's manager has private information on his ability. The principal can invest in monitoring to elicit this ability. As a...

This paper first presents various simple regulatory mechanisms, in particular Vogelsang and Finsinger's iterative mechanism and Shleifer's yardstick Regulation. Unfortunately, in practical applications of these simple mechanisms the regulated utility will be able to dodge the regulator's...

Bangladesh, a developing country, traditionally had had a system of university education which was public in operation. During the early 1990s, in line with other liberalization policies, Bangladesh allowed private initiatives in university education as well. During the last decade and a half,...

In this paper it is argued that privatization is not the only alternative to public ownership. Adopting the incomplete contract approach, it is shown that partial privatization may well be the optimal ownership structure. While in the standard incomplete contract model joint ownership is usually...

In this paper I have compared international standards on accounting for the public sector and those required by national norms on public institutions' own capitals, pointing out both convergences and divergences. Last, but not the least, I have compared IPSAS 1 (applied by public institutions)...

Brazil has been experimenting with Private Sector Participation (PSP) in the water and sanitation sector in various forms since the mid-nineties, one of the most common being concession contracts. Currently, 25% of the population is served by companies with private sector participation and this...

Since the fiscal burden of the citizens in the Republic of Croatia has reached its maximum, it is necessary to pay much more attention to non-fiscal financing of public requirements on the state level, as well as on the level of the units of local self-government. Significant non-fiscal income...

The usual analysis of privatization and X-inefficiency uses agency theory to model managerial effort. We model worker effort as determined by a bargain between firms and workers. Workers dislike effort because it lowers utility. Firms prefer high effort because it raises productivity....

We develop a theoretical framework for comparing the style of work in public and private enterprises. We incorporate ‘socializing’, as an activity that yields utility for workers and affects a firm’s output, into a simple multitask model of work organization. In contrast with previous...