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The rent-seeking model of Tullock (1980) has stimulated a large literature on rent-seekingcontests, of which Hillman (1989) and Nitzan (1994) provide useful surveys. AlthoughTullock's 'winner take all' model has been adapted and extended in numerous ways, thereremain fundamental modeling issues,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005869062
We investigate the Nash equilibria of asymmetric, winner-take-all, imperfectlydiscriminating contests, focussing on existence, uniqueness and rentdissipation. When the contest success function is determined by a productionfunction with decreasing returns for each contestant, equilibria...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868959
We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule \imitate-the-best" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. Weprovide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and showthat it can only be beaten by much in games that are of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248998
Assuming inequality averse subjects as modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or in the ERC model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) in ultimatum games with asymmetric conflict payoffs allows to make predictions especially concerning responder acceptance thresholds. These predictions are tested in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866680
Idiosyncratic risk attitudes are usually assumed to be commonly knownand restricted to own payos. However, the alternatives faced by a decisionmaker often involve risks for others' payos as well. Motivated by theimportance of other-regarding preferences in social interactions, this paperexplores...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866833
The paper compares two models of evolution in symmetric twoplayergames with incomplete information. One model postulates thatthe type of a player is fixed, and evolution works within types. Inthe other model type-contingent strategies evolve. In the case of twotypes and two strategies it is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868794
marginally only affects his own payoff.The altruist can reach her first best when she moves last if and only if a selfish … agentcannot manipulate the price of his payoff... …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868926
Player i's payoff in a noncooperative game is generally expressed as a function of thevector of strategies of all …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005869076
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008823319
In this paper, a group contest is analyzed, where the groups are allowed to determine their sharing rules either sequentially or simultaneously. It is found that in case the more numerous group determines its sharing rule prior to the smaller group, rent dissipation in the group contest is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366540