Empirical evidence shows that injury investigations in anti-dumping cases conducted by the United States International Trade Commission, the probability of a positive finding is higher when the number of defendant firms is larger, holding constant their total market share. In this paper we offer...

We study a policy game between exporting and importing countries in vertically linked industries. In a successive international Cournot oligopoly, we analyse incentives for using tax instruments strategically to shift rents vertically, between exporting and importing countries, and horizontally,...

This paper shows that governments have no incentive to introduce non-tariff barriers when they are free to set tariffs but they do when tariffs are determined cooperatively. We then show three results. First, with trade liberalization, there is a progression from using tariffs only to quotas,...

This paper studies the design of trade policies in an uncertain third market with incomplete information. Governments in each of the two countries select either direct quantity controls or subsidies in an attempt to shift profits in favour of their own firms in an oligopolistic setting. It is...

We consider an international cartel whose members interact repeatedly in their own as well as in third-country segmented markets. Cartel discipline-an inverse measure of the degree of competition between firms-is endogenously determined by the cartel’s incentive compatibility constraint (ICC),...

Economic theory predicts that outsourcing public services to private firms will reduce costs, but the effect on quality is ambiguous. We explore quality differences between publicly and privately owned ambulances in a setting where patients are as good as randomly assigned to ambulances of...

I study welfare and distributional effects of import tariffs in a two-country asymmetric general oligopolistic equilibrium trade model. Tariffs have an anti-competitive effect that reduces labor demand because firms want to shorten supply. Unilaterally increasing the import tariff in absence of...

Several developing countries impose high tariffs, directly or indirectly, on imports of manufactured goods such as vehicles and machinery. In many cases governments argue that they need such policies to protect domestic manufacturing industries from foreign competition while simultaneously...

We build a model of tacit collusion between firms that operate in multiple markets to study the effects of trade costs. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint....

This paper empirically studies the effects of European antidumping actions on import diversion from importers named in an antidumping investigation, and potentially subject to protectionist measures, to countries not named in the investigation and European domestic suppliers. For this purpose, a...