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neglected by economists. In our experiments the crowding out effect is so strong that the incentive contracts are less efficient …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014038698
We experimentally test the efficacy of indenture as a self-enforced contract device. In an indenture game, the principal signals the intention of payment-on-delivery, by tearing a banknote and giving the agent half of it as prepayment; the agent receives the completing half after delivering the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276832
games increases over time. -- Cooperation ; experiment ; contracts ; indenture ; reciprocity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003793109
We experimentally test the efficacy of indenture as a self-enforced contract device. In an indenture game, the principal signals the intention of payment-on-delivery, by tearing a banknote and giving the agent half of it as "prepayment"; the agent receives the completing half after delivering...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014206562
neglected by economists. In our experiments the crowding out effect is so strong that the incentive contracts are less efficient …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627780
We examine experimentally how Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) respond to incentives and how they provide incentives in situations requiring trust and trustworthiness. As a control we compare the behavior of CEOs with the behavior of students. We find that CEOs are considerably more trusting and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627811
We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our design admits observation of promises, lies, and beliefs. The evidence is consistent with people striving to live up to others' expectations in order to avoid guilt, as can be modeled using psychological game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014089179
How can a principal (an agent) ensure that an agent (a principal) will work (pay up), if payment (work) precedes work (payment)? When a banknote is torn in two, each part is by itself worthless. A principal can pre-commit to payment-on-delivery, by tearing a banknote and giving the agent the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010297243
We experimentally test the efficacy of indenture as a self-enforced contract device. In an indenture game, the principal signals the intention of payment-on-delivery, by tearing a banknote and giving the agent half of it as "prepayment"; the agent receives the completing half after delivering...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005069044
How can a principal (an agent) ensure that an agent (a principal) will work (pay up), if payment (work) precedes work (payment)? When a banknote is torn in two, each part is by itself worthless. A principal can pre-commit to payment-on-delivery, by tearing a banknote and giving the agent the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008683700