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From Good Institutions to Generous Citizens : Top-Down Incentives to Cooperate Promote Subsequent Prosociality But Not Norm Enforcement

Stagnaro, Michael; Arechar, Antonio; Rand, David G. - 2017

What makes people willing to pay costs to help others, and to punish others’ selfishness? Why does the extent of such behaviors vary markedly across cultures? To shed light on these questions, we explore the role of formal institutions in shaping individuals’ prosociality and punishment. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014035336

Harnessing Reciprocity to Promote Cooperation and the Provisioning of Public Goods

Rand, David G.; Yoeli, Erez; Hoffman, Moshe - 2015

How can we maximize the common good? This is a central organizing question of public policy design, across political parties and ideologies. The answer typically involves the provisioning of public goods such as fresh air, national defense, and knowledge. Public goods are costly to produce but...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014037089

Cooperation and Decision Time

Evans, Anthony; Rand, David G. - 2018

We review two fundamentally different ways that decision time is related to cooperation. First, studies have experimentally manipulated decision time to understand how cooperation is related to the use of intuition versus deliberation. Current evidence supports the claim that time pressure (and,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014113978

Physical distance and cooperativeness towards strangers

Kühl, Leonie; Szech, Nora - 2017

fixed. The data shows that an increase in local physical distance decreases willingness to donate. A laboratory experiment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011781777

Competition, Hidden Information and Efficiency : An Experiment

Cabrales, Antonio - 2006

We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012779356

Contract compliance under biased expectations : evidence from an experiment in Ghana

Fischer, Sabine; Grosch, Kerstin - 2020

payoff from the contract. Results from our lab experiment in Ghana indicate that overconfident agents, i.e., agents with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012200093

Competition, Hidden Information, and Efficiency : An Experiment

Charness, Gary; Cabrales, Antonio; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2010

We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014055844

In search of workers' real effort reciprocity : a field and a laboratory experiment

Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Rockenbach, Bettina; Sadrieh, … - 2005

We present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations on actual work effort of employees …. This result seems at odds with numerous laboratory experiments that show a clear own wage sensitivity on effort. In an … additional real-effort laboratory experiment we show that explicit cost and surplus information that enables to exactly calculate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343961

In search of workers' real effort reciprocity : a field and a laboratory experiment

Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Rockenbach, Bettina; Sadrieh, … - 2008 - Updated version of paper no 55

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365848

Incentive contracts when agents distort probabilities

Gonzalez Jimenez, Victor H. - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 15 (2024) 3, pp. 607-653

optimal. A theoretical framework and an experiment demonstrate that stochastic contracts implemented with small probabilities …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015053193