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Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530053
foreclosure in laboratory experiments. In one-shot interactions, upstream firms can choose to build a reputation by revealing …Building on the seminal paper of Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990), I study the role of reputation building on … their price history to the current upstream competitor. In particular, integrated firms can establish a reputation to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011555141
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011697162
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make a voluntary payment, a bonus, after observing advice quality. While the combination of competition and reputation …. Thus, our results suggest that a voluntary component can act as a substitute for either competition or reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011881706
concern for reputation, our model predicts that politicians' effort is increasing in their reputation concern. With … reputation-concerned individuals are more reluctant to join politics than those who worry less about their perceived moral … stature. Using data from lab-in-the-field experiments in rural India with local politicians and non-politician participants …
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We experimentally investigate how reputational concerns affect behavior in repeated Tullock contests by comparing expenditures of participants interacting in fixed groups with the expenditures of participants interacting with randomly changing opponents. When participants receive full...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011456852