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Actual behaviour is inuenced in important ways by moral emotions,for instance guilt or shame (see among others Tangney et al., 2007). Belief-dependant models of social preferences using the framework of psycho-logical games aim to consider such emotions to explain other-regardingbehaviour. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248884
's strategy. The utility model used to explain this kind of context dependency incorporates a preference for net …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010350219
’s strategy. The utility model used to explain this kind of context dependency incorporates a preference for net …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427666
’s strategy. The utility model used to explain this kind of context dependency incorporates a preference for net …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011210866
We study ultimatum and dictator experiments where the first mover chooses the amount of money to be distributed between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275044
We study ultimatum and dictator experiments where the first mover chooses the amount of money to be distributed between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008506719
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003880396
This paper reports the results of experiments designed to isolate the impact of various combinations of the following motives on trustworthiness: (i) unconditional other-regarding preferences - like altruism, inequality aversion, quasi-maximin, etc.; (ii) deal-responsiveness - reacting to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010406346
For the trust game, recent models of belief-dependent motivations make opposite predictions regarding the correlation between back-transfers and second- order beliefs of the trustor: While reciprocity models predict a negative correlation, guilt-aversion models predict a positive one. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011480420
We analyze the effects of introducing asymmetric information and expectations in the investment game (Berg et al., 1995). In our experiment, only the trustee knows the size of the surplus. Subjects' expectations about each other's behavior are also elicited. (...)
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005845178