This Paper views authority as the right to undertake decisions that have external effects on other members of the organization. Because of contractual incompleteness, monetary incentives are insufficient to internalize these effects in the decision-maker’s objective. The optimal assignment of...

This paper analyses the relation between authority and incentives. It extends the standard principal--agent model by a project selection stage in which the principal can either delegate the choice of project to the agent or keep the authority. The agent's subsequent choice of effort depends both...

We analyze a competitive labor market in which workers signal their productivities through education à la Spence (1973), and firms have the option of auditing to learn workers' productivities. Audits are costly and non–contractible. We characterize the trade–offs between signaling by...

1. Einführung und Grundlagen -- 2. Das Marktverhalten des Monopols -- 3. Oligopolistischer Wettbewerb -- 4. Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen -- 5. Forschung und Entwicklung -- 6. Anhang A: Spieltheoretische Grundlagen -- 7. Anhang B: Lösungen der Übungsaufgaben.