Showing 31 - 40 of 79
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002251978
Philip II of Spain accumulated debts equivalent to 60% of GDP. He also defaulted four times on his short-term loans, thus becoming the first serial defaulter in history. Contrary to a common view in the literature, we show that lending to the king was profitable even under worst-case scenario...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137652
The defaults of Philip II have attained mythical status as the origin of sovereign debt crises. We reassess the fiscal position of Habsburg Castile, deriving comprehensive estimates of revenue, debt, and expenditure from new archival data. The king's debts were sustainable. Primary surpluses...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013115653
What sustained borrowing without third-party enforcement, in the early days of sovereign lending? Philip II of Spain accumulated towering debts while stopping all payments to his lenders four times. How could the sovereign borrow much and default often? We argue that bankers' ability to cut off...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116884
Contingent sovereign debt can create important welfare gains. Nonetheless, there is almost no issuance today. Using hand-collected archival data, we examine the first known case of large-scale use of state-contingent sovereign debt in history. Philip II of Spain entered into hundreds of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013056397
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012244509
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700151
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700155
Contingent sovereign debt can create important welfare gains. Nonetheless, there is almost no issuance today. Using hand-collected archival data, we examine the first known case of large-scale use of state-contingent sovereign debt in history. Philip II of Spain entered into hundreds of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851380
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010908050