We develop a decentralized Bayesian model of college admissions with two ranked colleges, heterogeneous students, and two realistic match frictions: students find it costly to apply to college, and college evaluations of their applications are uncertain. Students thus face a portfolio choice...

In an economy with a continuum of individuals, each individual has a stochastic, continuously evolving endowment process. Individuals are risk averse and would therefore like to insure their endowment processes. It is feasible to obtain insurance by pooling endowments across individuals because...

This paper analyzes an infinite horizon model where a seller, who owns an indivisible unit of a good for sale, has incomplete information about the state of the world that determines not only the demand she faces but also her own valuation for the good. Over time, she randomly meets potential...

This paper analyzes a model with search frictions, heterogeneous agents, and nontransferable utility, in which each individual observes only a noisy signal of the type of a potential partner. We show that an agent's optimal strategy must take into account not only the realization of the noisy...

We analyze a principal-agent model with moral hazard in which the principal has private information about the technology, and the contract offered by her may signal this information to the agent. We characterize Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the game that possess the following properties that...

We introduce and solve a new class of static portfolio choice problems, where only the best realized alternative matters. A decision maker must simultaneously choose among independent ranked options, and the better alternatives have a lower chance of panning out. Each choice is costly, and just...

Is there an intrinsic nonconcavity to the value of information? In an influential paper, Radner and Stiglitz (1984, henceforth RS) suggests that there is. They demonstrated, in a seemingly general model, that the marginal value of a small amount of information is zero. Since costless information...