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Relaxing Pareto optimality in economic environments
Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - In: Economic theory 10 (1997) 1, pp. 115-130
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007198838
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A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule
Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - In: Economic theory 22 (2003) 3, pp. 557-568
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007161434
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A leximin characterization of strategy-proof and non-resolute social choice procedures
Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - In: Economic theory 20 (2002) 4, pp. 809-830
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007168129
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Are serial Condorcet rules strategy-proof?
Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - In: Review of economic design : RED 7 (2002) 4, pp. 385-410
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006031185
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Arrow's Theorem for Economic Domains and Edgeworth Hyperboxes
Bordes, Georges; Campbell, Donald E.; Le Breton, Miehel - In: International economic review 36 (1995) 2, pp. 441-454
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006069513
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Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda
Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - In: Economics letters 110 (2011) 3, pp. 272-274
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008843224
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Losses due to manipulation of social choice rules
Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - In: Economic theory 45 (2010) 3, pp. 453-468
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008710999
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Preference revelation with a limited number of indifference classes
Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - In: Spanish economic review : SER 4 (2002) 2, pp. 151
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008048250
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Arrovian Social Choice Correspondences
Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - In: International economic review 37 (1996) 4, pp. 803-824
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007321269
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Information and Preference Aggregation
Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - 2000
We investigate the implications of relaxing Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom while retaining transitivity and the Pareto condition. Even a small relaxation opens a floodgate of possibilities for nondictatorial and efficient social choice
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014176086