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Another proof that assignment games have simple singleton cores only if multiple optimal matchings exist

Wako, Jun - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 29 (2006) 1, pp. 213-217

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003359978

Strong core and competitive equilibria of an exchange market with indivisible goods

Wako, Jun - In: International economic review 32 (1991) 4, pp. 843-852

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001114745

Another proof that assignment games have singleton cores only if multiple optimal matchings exist

Wako, Jun - In: Economic Theory 29 (2006) 1, pp. 213-217

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005155407

Another proof that assignment games have singleton cores only if multiple optimal matchings exist

Wako, Jun - In: Economic theory 29 (2006) 1, pp. 213-218

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007288434

A note on the strong core of a market with indivisible goods

Wako, Jun - In: Journal of Mathematical Economics 13 (1984) 2, pp. 189-194

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005527161

Strong Core and Competitive Equilibria of an Exchange Market with Indivisible Goods.

Wako, Jun - In: International Economic Review 32 (1991) 4, pp. 843-52

The author considers an exchange model with indivisible goods and a perfectly divisible good, namely, money. This model was presented by M. Quinzii (1984) as an extension of the Shapley-Scarf model without divisible goods. The author proves that the strong core always coincides with the set of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005400632