In this paper we present a series of models, all within the context of a simple two-good economy, which bring out the distinctions between the different types of money and financial institutions. The models emphasize the physical properties of the economic goods, moneys, and trading systems. In...

We consider the n-player houseswapping game of Shapley-Scarf (1974), with indifferences in preferences allowed. It is well-known that the strict core of such a game may be empty, single-valued, or multivalued. We define a condition on such games called "segmentability", which means that the set...

We show that if y is an odd integer between 1 and 2^{n} - 1, there is an n x n bimatrix game with exactly y Nash equilibria (NE). We conjecture that this 2^{n} - 1 is a tight upper for n <= 3, and provide bounds on the number of NEs in m x n nondegenerate games when min(m,n) <= 4.

We show that if y is an odd integer between 1 and $2^{n}-1$, there is an $n\times n$ bimatrix game with exactly y Nash equilibria (NE). We conjecture that this $2^{n}-1$ is a tight upper bound on the number of NEs in a "nondegenerate" $n\times n$ game.

This paper concludes the study on the modeling of money and financial institutions, which began in Quint and Shubik (2005a and b), and Quint and Shubik (2007). This paper begins by going through some of the one-period models of trade, with and without a banking system, including a new...

The knowledge constraints and transactions costs imposed by geographical distance, network connections and time conspire to justify local behavior as a good approximation for global rationality. We consider a class of games to illustrate this relationship and raise some questions as to what...

A simple game-theoretic model of migration is proposed, in which the players are animals, the strategies are territories in a landscape to which they may migrate, and the payoffs for each animal are determined by its ultimate location and the number of other animals there. If the payoff to an...