In this paper we present a series of models, all within the context of a simple two-good economy, which bring out the distinctions between the different types of money and financial institutions. The models emphasize the physical properties of the economic goods, moneys, and trading systems. In...

In this paper we present a series of models, all within the context of a simple two-good economy, which bring out the distinctions between the different types of money and financial institutions. The models emphasize the physical properties of the economic goods, moneys, and trading systems....

We consider the voting-with-absenteeism game of Quint-Shubik (2003). In that paper we defined a power index for such games, called the absentee index. Our analysis was based on the theory of the Shapley-Shubik power index (SSPI) for simple games. In this paper we do an analogous analysis, based...

A voting with absenteeism game is defined as a pair (G;r) where G is an n-player (monotonic) simple game and r is an n-vector for which r_{i} is the probability that player i attends a vote. We define a power index for such games, called the absentee index. We axiomatize the absentee index and...

Using simple but rigorously defined mathematical models, Thomas Quint and Martin Shubik explore monetary control in a simple exchange economy. Examining how money enters, circulates, and exits an economy, they consider the nature of trading systems and the role of government authority in the...

"Using simple but rigorously defined mathematical models, Thomas Quint and Martin Shubik explore monetary control in a simple exchange economy. Examining how money enters, circulates, and exits an economy, they consider the nature of trading systems and the role of government authority in the...

The knowledge constraints and transactions costs imposed by geographical distance, network connections and time conspire to justify local behavior as a good approximation for global rationality. We consider a class of games to illustrate this relationship and raise some questions as to what...

Consider a simple game with n players. Let ψ<Subscript>i</Subscript> be the Shapley–Shubik power index for player i. Then 1-ψ<Subscript>i</Subscript> measures his powerlessness. We break down this powerlessness into two components – a `quixote index' Q <Subscript>i</Subscript> (which measures how much of a `quixote' i is), and a `follower...</subscript></subscript></subscript>

The knowledge constraints and transactions costs imposed by geographical distance, network connections and time conspire to justify local behavior as a good approximation for global rationality. We consider a class of games to illustrate this relationship and raise some questions as to what...

We prove that a "nondegenerate" m x m coordination game can have at most 2^{M} - 1 Nash equilibria, where M = min(m,n).