Showing 161 - 170 of 170
It is well known for the common multi-population evolutionary dynamics applied to normal form games that a pure strategy combination is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a strict equilibrium point. We extend this result to sets as follows. For certain regular selection dynamics every...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008852264
The introduction of sanctions provides incentives for more pro-social behavior, but may also be a signal that non-cooperation is prevalent. In an experimental minimum-effort coordination game we investigate the effects of the information contained in the choice to sanction. We compare the effect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048233
This paper introduces the concept of ordient for binary relations (preferences), a relative of the concept of gradient for functions (utilities). Ordients have a natural economic interpretation as marginal rates of substitution. Some examples of ordientable binary relations include the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011076677
Individuals belonging to two large populations are repeatedly randomly matched to play a cyclic $2\times 2$ game such as Matching Pennies. Between matching rounds, individuals sometimes change their strategy after observing a finite sample of other outcomes within their population. Individuals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005622500
This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider pricesetting environments...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561906
Games with multiple Nash equilibria are believed to be easier to play if players can communicate. We present a simple model of communication in games and investigate the importance of when communication takes place. Sending a message before play captures talk about intentions, after play...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011140987
In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that only the Cournot outcome, but not the Stackelberg outcome, can be supported by a pure Nash equilibrium when actions of the Stackelberg leader are observed with the slightest error. The Stackelberg outcome, however, remains close to the outcome of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010983849
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