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Does noise undermine the first-mover advantage? : An evolutionary analysis of Bagwell's example
Oechssler, Joerg; Schlag, Karl H. - In: International game theory review 2 (2000) 1, pp. 83-96
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001613900
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Evolutionarily stable sets
Balkenborg, Dieter; Schlag, Karl H. - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 29 (2000) 4, pp. 571-595
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001606849
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Evolutionary insights on the willingness to communicate
Hurkens, Sjaak; Schlag, Karl H. - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 31 (2002) 4, pp. 511-526
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001800740
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Sophistical imitation in cyclic games
Hofbauer, Josef; Schlag, Karl H. - In: Journal of evolutionary economics : JEE 10 (2000) 5, pp. 523-543
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001523791
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You play (an action) only once
Schlag, Karl H. - In: Economics letters 59 (1998) 3, pp. 299-303
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001242931
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The dynamic (in)stability of backwards induction
Cressman, Ross - 1996
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000929473
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Which one should I imitate?
Schlag, Karl H. - 1996
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000930616
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Loss of commitment? : an evolutionary analysis of Bagwell's example
Oechssler, Joerg - 1997
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000971040
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Evolution in partnership games, an equivalence result
Schlag, Karl H. - 1994
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000903649
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When does evolution lead to efficiency in communication games?
Schlag, Karl H. - 1994
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000903650