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Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions

Harsha, Pavithra; Barnhart, Cynthia; Parkes, David C.; … - 2009

Activity rules have emerged in recent years as an important aspect of practical auction design. The role of an activity rule in an iterative auction is to suppress strategic behavior by bidders and promote simple, continual, meaningful bidding and thus, price discovery. These rules find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009432086