We develop a dynamic duopoly, in which firms have to take into account a technological externality, which reduces their innovation costs over time, and an inter-firm spillover, which lowers only the second comer’s R&D costs. This spillover exerts its effect after a disclosure lag. We identify...

In this paper we analyze the effects of some distortions induced by the prospective payment system, i.e. upcoding, cream skimming and readmissions, on hospitals' technical efficiency. We estimate a production function using a population-based dataset composed by all active hospitals in an...

This paper investigates the vertical relations in the Italian retail gasoline industry to study their effects on the retail price. The retailer, in presence of a quantity-decreasing unit discount scheme on the gasoline purchased, has to decide whether to follow the retail price recommended by...

We investigate how the intensity of competition among airports affects their technical efficiency by computing airports’ markets on the basis of a potential demand approach. We find that the intensity of competition has a negative impact on airports’ efficiency in Italy during the...

We present a dynamic duopoly model of technical innovation where R&D costs decrease exogenously with time, and inter-firm knowledge spillover lowers the second comer's R&D cost. The spillover effect only becomes available after a disclosure lag. These features allow us to identify a new type of...

In our duopoly, an irreversible investment incorporates a significant amount of R&D, so that the improvement it introduces in production processes generates a spillover lowering the second comer's investment cost. The presence of the inter-firm spillover substantially affects the equilibrium of...

This paper presents a political economy model of antitrust policy against horizontal price-fixing. The policy is implemented through discretion. In the event of collusion the public agency can enforce competition through fines and behavioral constraints. The paper shows that while fines do not...

In this paper we study the efficiency of Italian airports applying a DEA model to 34 airports. We find that large airports are more efficient than domestic and regional ones, i.e. small airports have spare capacity since they are more distant from the frontier than large airports. The Tobit...

A wider RJV extension hastens process innovations at the cost of increasing collusion in the final market. In a Cournot model, an extended RJV is welfare enhancing only when the Antitrust Authority is strong, so that the increase in distortion is limited, and when the size of the technical...