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We estimate the association between parental earnings and a wide variety of indicators of child well-being using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) matched to administrative earnings records from the Social Security Administration. We find that the use of longer time...
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The authors conclude that just under half of the post-1999 decline in the U.S. labor force participation rate, or LFPR (the proportion of the working-age population that is employed or unemployed and seeking work), can be explained by long-running demographic patterns, such as the retirement of...
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A principal often needs to match agents to perform coordinated tasks, but agents can quit or slack off if they dislike their match. We study two prevalent approaches for matching within organizations: Centralized assignment by firm leaders and self-organization through market-like mechanisms. We...
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How should executives strategically allocate talent? Organizations have recently adopted talent marketplaces to address job assignment and internal mobility. We formalize the worker-to-division matching problem, in which executives match workers and divisions, and face agents' preferences as the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014345195
We develop a principal/agent model for matching agents in two-sided assignments. A principal has preferences over all agents' assignments, and agents have privately-known preferences about their own match (but are indifferent about others'). Unhappy agents can quit, but the principal can stop...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014351241