We analyze the preferences of a risk-averse seller over the class of "standard" auctions with symmetric and risk-neutral bidders. Assuming that buyers' private signals are independently distributed, we find that a sealed-bid first-price auction with an appropriately set reserve price is...

Typical queues do not have constant arrival rates. This paper discusses effective computational methods for dealing with queues having nonstationary arrival processes. It presents a computationally undemanding approximate method for finding the time dependent mean and standard deviation of the...

Combinatorial auctions have two features that greatly affect their design: computational complexity of winner determination and opportunities for cooperation among competitors. Dealing with these forces trade-offs between desirable auction properties such as allocative efficiency, revenue...

Management Science recently printed an exchange of views between Kadane and Larkey (Kadane, J. B., P. D. Larkey. 1982. Subjective probability and the theory of games. Management Sci. 28 113--120; Kadane, J. B., P. D. Larkey. 1982. Reply to Professor Harsanyi. Management Sci. 28 124.) and Harsanyi...

This note bridges a logical gap created by an unstated assumption in a proof in the referred-to paper.

A widespread practice, particularly in public-sector procurement and dispersal, is to subsidize a class of competitors believed to be at an economic disadvantage. Arguments for such policies vary, but they typically assume that benefits of subsidization must be large enough to outweigh a...

This paper develops two stochastic models of an internal mail delivery system in which a single clerk picks up, sorts and delivers mail to a closed loop of offices. The two models differ in whether deliveries are made at scheduled times or not. For a model in which all mail picked up each round...