This paper provides a step towards a more complete theory of lobbying, extending the menu-auction model of Grossman and Helpman [Grossman, G.M., Helpman, E., 1994. American Economic Review 84, 833-850] A new explanation is proposed for why more concentrated industries more easily overcome the...

Empirically collusive industries are known to be highly effective lobbyists. The reasons for this unclear and poorly understood. This paper provides a new explanation for the formation of protectionistic lobby groups. The level of collusion is shown to be a crucial determinant of the ability of...

Does environmental lobbying affect the probability of environmental treaty ratification? Does the level of government corruption play a role for the success of such lobbying? In this paper, we propose that a more corruptible government may be more responsive to the demands of the environmental...

This paper argues that it is countries' historical experience with democracy, the democratic capital stock, rather than current levels of democracy that determines current climate change policies. Empirical evidence using data starting as far back as year 1800 for 87 countries, which together...

This paper argues that it is countries’ historical experience with democracy, the democratic capital stock, rather than current levels of democracy that determines current climate change policies. Empirical evidence using data starting as far back as year 1800 for 87 countries, which together...

No systematic study has examined the effect of post-conflict justice on the duration of peace on a global basis. This paper attempts to fill that void by building on a newly constructed dataset (Binningsbo, Elster, and Gates 2005), which reports the presence of various forms of post-conflict...